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New geographies of resource extraction
Introduction
Géraud Magrin et Laetitia Perrier-Bruslé
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
This dossier has been coordinated by Géraud Magrin and Laetitia Perrier-Bruslé who
would like to thank all the reviewers of the articles, as well as Nicolas Donner for his help
with editing the introduction.
1 Following up on a previous dossier devoted to mining in West  Africa,1 EchoGéo now
extends its exploration of the geography of resource extraction today by focusing on
some new areas (Burkina Faso, Guyana, Gabon, Gulf of Guinea, South Asia, and East Africa)
and a variety of resources (gold, iron, oil, precious stones). The five articles in this dossier
explore a range of sites, strategies, relationships between parties involved and between
the  parties  and  their  environments.  In  all  these  processes,  space  functions  as  an
explanatory dimension or significant context.
2 This introduction  is  intended  to  put  these  articles  into  perspective,  identifying  the
invariant factors and new parameters that are now shaping the outlines of the geography
of resource extraction;  it  then presents and in some cases comments on the specific
contribution of each article.
 
The extractive base and global contradictions 
3 Natural resource extraction is soaked in history, and in suffering. At a time when the
virtual world seems to be in the ascendant – with the apparent decrease in importance of
production of goods in national economies, the hypertrophic growth of the digital sphere,
the era of Facebook and of knowledge industries – it bears remembering that more than
ever, this all starts, or at least is all made possible, with the availability of the natural
substances that lie beneath our feet. Liquid modernity (Bauman, 2006) has a vital need of
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energy and of solid physical objects. Today’s globalization is born from the alchemy that
transforms  raw  materials  extracted  from  deep  below  ground  into  natural  resources
(Raffestin, 1980). At least since the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century, these
resources underpin the functioning of the global system (Gottmann, 1952). They provide
the energy (coal, oil, uranium) essential in an increasingly bulimic world, as well as the
raw  materials  for  manufacturing  all  sorts  of  things,  including  heavy  (iron,  copper,
bauxite, etc.) and light (rare metals and rare earths), as well as materials with a symbolic
value that varies in importance (gold, diamonds, precious stones).
4 But our age is an anxious one, verging on the ungrateful. The extractive operations that
support the refinements of contemporary globalization have a bad name. They are linked
with  many  kinds  of  degradation  of  the  environment:  consumption  of  carbon-based
energy is a major cause of global warming; some substances though harmless in their
inert form become harmful in the course of extraction, transport,  or subsequent use,
rendering  their  “excesses”2 dangerous  because  difficult  to  control  (technically  and
geographically),  as in the case of  oil-based marine pollution or nuclear accidents;  all
resource extraction threatens, to varying degrees,  the local environments in which it
takes place, and this damage is less and less tolerated. The extraction of raw materials
from underground is also a political liability: this has given rise to the concept of the
“natural resource curse,” which links poverty with wealth derived from natural resources
in an uncompromising vicious circle. In countries with weak institutions, in particular,
income from mining royalties tends to be attended by a group of misfortunes that can be
both macro-economic (stagnation of the productive sectors, indebtedness) and political
(authoritarianism, corruption, conflict) and tend to perpetuate underdevelopment (see
the critical synthesis by Rosser, 2006; Le Billon, 2005, on conflict; Magrin, 2011). Lastly,
the fact that producers and consumers only partly overlap means that the most strategic
of these natural resources becomes a central issue in international relations and tensions
(Gabriel-Oyhamburu, 2010).
5 The  extremely  sensitive  nature  of  extraction  and  its  problems  thus  reflects  the
contradictions on which the modern world is built. Geography and geopolitics combine
pre-existing features with new dynamics. The articles in this dossier, beyond the specific
situations  they  describe,  can  help  to  decode  the  importance  and  meaning  of  these
developments.
6 Not everything is new in the geography of resource extraction. Geology is in large part
static.  The major  producers  of  principal  extractive resources  are  stable  entities.  The
geopolitical conditions based on them are largely permanent: the giant oil fields in the
Middle East, North Africa, Russia, and Venezuela, support royalty-based economies and
more or less authoritarian, even violent, political systems (Martinez, 2010). These systems
are  central  to  international  relations  in  which  states  are  dynamically  asymmetric,
depending on whether they possess resources, the technology to extract them, both of
these, or neither; the control of distribution capacity constitutes a key asset (Raffestin,
1980).  The  article  by  Romain  Dittgen  clearly  sets  out  the  characteristics  of  the
confrontation between the Chinese giant and the little Gabon whose iron it is attracted
by. Africa is still stuck in its historical role as a subordinate provider of natural resources,
including extractive ones,  for the global system, even if  that role does not exclude a
(variable) degree of autonomy (Bayart, 1989).
7 Relationships to resources are also characterized by cyclic phenomena, even if, here as
elsewhere, history operates in something more like a solenoid movement than an eternal
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recurrence. In one example of this, the fear that resources would be used up, expressed
forcefully during the oil crises of the 1970s, led the Club of Rome to recommend zero
growth  long  before  the  current  fashion  for  limits  on  growth.  Since  the  late  1990s
sustained global economic growth, driven entirely by the major emerging countries since
the 2008 financial crisis, has boosted commodity prices, particularly those of extractive
resources. The end of the age of easily accessible resources has geographic implications: it
triggers the race for new resources hitherto protected by inaccessible environments,
whether  ecological  (the  poles,  very  deep  ocean  sites,  dense  forests)  or  geopolitical.
Modern extractive exploration, by crossing these new frontiers3 in areas that may be
under the scrutiny of world public opinion due to their high ecological value, generates
new environmental and political risks, and hence new techniques for managing risk and
protecting  mining  operations,  as  is  shown  in  Nicolas  Donner’s  article  on  the
immunization of oilfield enclaves.
8 Just as cyclical are the commodity markets, which sustain a dialectical relationship with
state  resource  management  policies.  Each  boom (of  energy  or  minerals)  triggers  an
upsurge in extractive nationalism, as ephemeral as the royalties that made it possible.
The 1960s and 1970s saw the nationalization of resources in several major oil-producing
countries,  the  creation of  OPEC,  the  increased presence  on the  world  stage  of  some
countries with extractive resources (such as Gabon with its oil and Mobutu’s Zaire with its
copper).  The 2000s saw a corresponding appearance of oil  and mining nationalism in
other countries, including the nationalization of gas in Bolivia (Perrier-Bruslé, 2008), and
the increased presence of Chavez’s Venezuela and of tiny Equatorial Guinea in Central
Africa.  However,  relationships  are  more  complex  than they  might  appear.  The  Arab
Spring has swept away some clichés. It reminds us that oil is no more central than any
other resource to all these political and geopolitical upheavals. Is the fall of Gaddafi the
exception that proves the rule according to which some oil states are “sustainable failed
states”4 (Soares de Oliveira, 2007)?
9 Major changes can also be in the spirit of the times. The fear of a shortage of resources
combines with the fear of even wider threats, the foremost of them global warming. The
issue  of  the  local  and  global  viability  of  the  relations  between  societies  and  their
environments has given rise to the paradigm of sustainable development, which is now
unavoidable. Its influence on the worldwide geography of resource extraction remains to
be  analyzed.  In  Latin  America  and  more  recently  in  Africa,  new  movements  are
originating in civil  society,  sometimes led by those living in or  near extractive sites
(indigenous peoples and other concerned inhabitants), complemented by national and
international NGOs concerned with human rights or the environment; these groups draw
on  the  precepts  of  sustainable  development  to  assert  their  rights  to  oversee  the
operations of large mining companies or state policies with respect to the handing over of
natural  resources.  Instead  of  the  fait  accompli  of  former  days,  discussions  focus  on
limiting the  negative  local  impacts  of  extraction and improving transparency in  the
management of royalty revenues (see Magrin, 2011).  The combined pressures of local
communities, Western public opinion, and shareholders, as well as the bad experiences of
the  past,  are  encouraging large  companies  to  go  the  route  of  corporate  social  and
environmental  responsibility  (CSR).  Thus,  in  an  ultimate  paradox,  it  has  even  been
claimed  that  the  exploitation  of  nonrenewable  resources  can  support sustainable
development,  as is demonstrated by the iconic oil  project in Chad (see Donner, 2003;
Magrin,  2003,  2011).  Jessica Oder’s  article on changes in the gold mining industry in
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French  Guyana  describes  some  thwarted  attempts  to  make  this  reformed  extractive
industry serve the goals of sustainable development in a specific region.
10 What  is  the  potential  effect  of  these  changes?  To  what  extent  is  current  rhetoric
accompanied by real changes in corporate practice? And leaving aside those questions,
what is the current impact of these mines on the geography of their host environment?
Technological changes mean that mining no longer has the same economic ripple effects
as  in  the  past:  mechanization  at  the  site  reduces  employment  opportunities  and
migration (Deshaies, 2007); neoliberal oil production and mining regulations promoted by
the World Bank, especially in Africa,5 limit the level of extraction and control by the
states  concerned  (Campbell,  2009).  Mines  no  longer  have  the  structural  impact  on
urbanization  and  social  density  that  they  had  in  the  past,  for  example  in  Southern
Africa’s  copper  belt  (Ferguson,  1999).  Facilities  constructed  in  potentially  hostile
environments adopt the model of the enclave rather than the integrated adjunct (Magrin,
van Vliet, 2005; Donner, 2009). Extractive facilities are implanted in previously staked out
extraterritorial zones that contribute to the fragmentation of national territories, while
at  the  same  time  they  underpin  the  operation  of  contemporary  globalized  space
(Antheaume,  Giraut,  2005;  Ferguson,  2006).  But  the  potential  impact  of  these
archipelagos, especially the extractive ones, surely also resides in their ability to make
use of the local and national context in which they exist and to structure it in return
(Arrault,  2005).  Extraction  sites  are  now  in  the  global  spotlight.  But  the  current
expectation on the part of global society that developing countries should protect and set
aside areas of high ecological value is difficult for those countries to accept when these
areas  contain  natural  resources.  Ecuador’s  proposal  to  abandon  exploitation  of
hydrocarbons in the Amazonia, in the Yasuni reserve, in exchange for compensation from
the rest of the world, is not without interest. It could also inspire other countries that
find they have to arbitrate the coexistence of oil extraction and biodiversity “hotspots” –
such as Mauritania, which is tempted by the possibility of oil exploration on the edge of
the Banc d’Arguin (Magrin et al.,  2011).  Is  it  true that supposedly ethical  sustainable
development will be so manipulated that it will serve only to protect extractive enclaves,
as  envisaged  here  by  Nicolas  Donner?  Or,  instead,  will  the  national  development  of
extractive  resources  in  a  new and better  regulated context,  or  at  least  one open to
discussion, make room for different options for sociopolitical systems based on royalty
revenue, thus escaping the rut of the “resource curse” (van Vliet, Magrin, 2009), along the
lines suggested by Conrad’s Nostromo (Magrin, 2011)?
11 Another major change concerns the protagonists of the extraction industries. Along with
the  emergence  of  national  public  opinion  on  these  issues  and  of  civil  society
organizations, small companies (independents in the case of oil, “juniors” in mining) and
companies  from  the  major  emerging  countries have  arrived  on  the  international
extraction scene. These latter two categories, though otherwise very different, are both
seen as largely impervious to CSR because they do not have a global image to preserve in
the eyes of consumers or shareholders – as is shown in Matthieu Thune’s article about the
operation of a goldmine in Burkina Faso by an English “junior.” The rise of these small
companies was first encouraged by the financialization that characterizes globalization
today (Megret, 2011). They mainly specialize in initial prospecting and the exploitation of
small  deposits,  or  of  deposits  that  are  almost  exhausted,  where  cost  and  operating
conditions  deter  the  bigger  companies  (van  Vliet,  1998;  Magrin,  van  Vliet,  2005).
Companies from emerging countries initially engaged in this type of operation and also
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invested in geopolitically risky environments or in countries out of bounds to Western
companies, for example the Chinese oil companies who dealt with the Sudan while it was
under embargo. More recently, their increased technological and financial capacity has
enabled them to meet the competition with respect to almost all types of deposit.6 Thus
the rise of Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian nationals, developing strategies for acquiring
the reserves of raw materials that are strategic for supplying their expanding industries,
is one aspect of the major global transformation marked by the relative decline of the old
powers (US and Europe) and the shift of the global center of eco-demographic gravity to
Asia.
12 These new players generate new relationships and new power-relations, both with host
countries and with Western companies. It would be simplistic to see this new situation as
merely  an  increase  in  competition  between  businesses:  the  players  also  need  to
complement  one  another  because  of  the  diversity  of  deposits  –  in  size,  operating
conditions  (accessibility,  geopolitical  challenges,  regulation),  and  the  stage  at  which
exploitation takes place (initial exploration, beginning or end of the extraction cycle). All
the participants need to work within the same system. Moreover, there is a fundamental
difference between companies from the North and emerging ones with respect to CSR:
ethical extraction seems to give the former a comparative advantage in the face of the
threat posed by the latter (Soares de Oliveira, 2008). Conversely, the fact that companies
from the South are less suspected of economic imperialism gives them an advantage in
contract negotiations with left-wing governments who are anxious to end their historical
inequality with the major Western powers. Examples of this are the concessions granted
by Bolivia to the Indian company Jindal Steel and Power Limited for the exploitation of
iron in Mutun, or the facilities accorded by these post-colonial countries to Petrobras
(Brazil) and Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA) in the hydrocarbon sector. Yet it would
be reductive to claim that these newcomers help keep the “resource curse” alive because
their standards are bound to be lower than those of the major Western companies, or that
their arrival on the scene is bound to lead to some sort of social  and environmental
“dumping.” The few studies available on the subject, such as that on the environmental
regulation of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in Chad, indicate that the
truth is more complex, and that there are significant similarities in company practices no
matter what their origins, though they advance at different speeds and in different ways
(van  Vliet,  Magrin,  eds.,  2011).  Romain  Dittgen’s  article  here  on  Chinese  plans  for
exploiting iron resources at Bélinga in Gabon shows, similarly, that Chinese strategies
allow for frequent adjustments and turn out to be less subject to political goals and more
responsive to market indicators than might have been expected. 
 
Five stories of resource extraction today
13 Needless to say, the five articles included in this issue do not exhaust the complexity of
the subject as briefly presented. They do offer a variety of topics, levels, and standpoints.
Four  natural  resources  are  discussed:  petroleum,  iron,  gold,  and  precious  stones,  in
descending order of importance for the operation of the global economic system. The
first two are basic to that operation, especially oil. The other two are significant for other
reasons. Gold, although of little industrial use and relatively abundant, has maintained its
value as a safe haven, despite (or in conflict with) all the changes caused by globalization.
The current high price of gold has led to an upsurge in mining on every continent. The
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global geography of precious stones is less well known, apart from diamonds; the factors
that affect them make is what distinguishes these precious stones from other extractive
resources. The articles presented here also address different levels of activity: Matthieu
Thune examines how a mine fits into its local environment; Jessica Oder and Romain
Dittgen look at the issues relative to a specific industry (gold in Guyana) and a giant
project (iron from Bélinga in Gabon) where the regions concerned are similar in size.
Nicolas Donner and Rémy Canavesio take a global view, examining the processes specific
to  a  type  of  resource  (oil  and precious  stones  respectively),  the  former  focusing  on
examples  from  the  Gulf  of  Guinea,  the  latter  on  South  Asia  and  East  Africa.  The
contributors investigate a range of specific topics: the impact of a mining project on the
local community (gold in Burkina Faso, iron in Gabon); the thinking behind the security
measures in oil  enclaves;  the factors that lead to reorganization of  an industry,  in a
specific region (gold in Guyana) or globally (the geography of precious stones).
14 Matthieu Thune’s article, “L’industrialisation de l’exploitation de l’or à Kalsaka, Burkina
Faso : une chance pour une population rurale pauvre ?” (“The industrialization of gold
mining in Kalsaka, Burkina Faso: an opportunity for a poor rural population?”) is set in
the context of the upsurge in industrial gold mining in West Africa during the 2000s
(Campbell, 2009; Mbodj, 2011), a time when Burkina Faso was one of the last El Dorados.
The mine, located in a poor region in the south of the Mossi Plateau that has long been
extremely overpopulated, could be seen as providing an opportunity for the local people
or alternatively as an additional source of problems. The mine was excavated on a hill
where farming and panning for gold had coexisted well enough in the past, the latter
providing  valuable  diversification  in  the  rural  economy.  The  article  shows  how,  in
Kalsaka  as  often  elsewhere  in  West  Africa,  the  compensation  paid  by  the  company
carrying out the new resource extraction has taken fundamentally different forms for
farmers  and for  traditional  artisanal  miners.  Farmers’  use  rights  are  recognized and
compensated; the individual beneficiaries’ subsequent histories vary, but can often be
predicted  based  on  their  previous  situations.  The  losses  suffered  by  traditional  gold
miners are not taken into account, despite the longstanding existence of this activity and
the customary laws that regulate it. What explains this differential treatment? Perhaps it
has less to do with the difference between above-ground and underground resources (the
land itself in both cases is owned by the State, which grants land use rights to the local
people) and more with the relationship of these practices to space,  agriculture being
more  sedentary  and  gold  panning  more  mobile.  On  the  hill  at  Kalsaka,  the  mining
industry has thus ousted artisanal extraction from the lode. But this activity was coming
to an end in any case, because with the available techniques it was impossible to seek for
gold at any great depth underground. Furthermore, the new mine’s economic benefit for
the local community is minimal: as always, the number of jobs is limited, and they are
almost out of reach of the local people. The company maintains community relations in
the  form of  lip-service  and  some  paternalism,  but  real  initiatives  are  minimal.  The
miners’ low wages do not make up the shortfall resulting from the end of traditional
extraction in the locality. All in all, the Kalsaka gold mine seems to have been neither an
opportunity nor a complete disaster for the locals. The article ends by noting the need for
comparison  with  other  sites:  is  the  poor  return  to  the  local  community  due  to  the
strategy of a “junior” operator (an English company, Cluff Gold) with an unusually low
interest in CSR practices? Or is it  inherent in the enclave mentality inevitable in the
mining industry today?
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15 Jessica Oder’s contribution, “Vers la structuration d’une filière aurifère ‘durable’ ? Le cas
de  la  Guyane  française”  (“Towards  the  organization  of  a  ‘sustainable’  gold-mining
industry?  The  case  of  French  Guyana”),  discusses  resources  that  are  geologically
continuous  with  the  extractive  base  of  West  Africa,  on  the  ancient  continent  of
Gondwana.  The  apparent  symmetry  between  Guyana  and  West  Africa,  and  the
comparisons it inspires, contribute significantly to the interest of this article, although
the processes studied exist in radically different political contexts: an African state with
weak regulatory capacity versus an overseas possession of France. In Africa the policy of
courting investment in mining is justified primarily by the resources it will bring to the
state (whereas employment is a demand put forward only by those who live in the mining
areas –  and a permanent source of  dissatisfaction);  in Guyana the encouragement of
modern  industrial  exploitation  of  gold  mines  is  a  state  policy,  backed  by  the  local
authorities, intended to address the need for economic diversification and job creation at
a time of population growth that is seen as intense by the standards of metropolitan
France. Those principally involved in the gold industry in French Guyana today are small
or  very  small  businesses  who  struggle  to  meet  the  requirements  imposed  by  the
government, which seems to have been suddenly converted to the religion of sustainable
development by the Grenelle de l’environnement of 2007. Therein lies the paradox of
Guyanese gold mining, as analyzed by Oder: here, unlike Africa, the unprecedented rise in
gold prices is accompanied by a production crisis in the official gold mining sector, due
especially to illegal gold extraction. Is this because the state is too strong, stifling private
initiative  by  imposing  regulatory  measures  beyond  the  capacity  of  fragile  small
businesses? Or is it rather because it is too weak to support the mining companies, or to
control vast areas of forest that are sparsely populated and liable to be infiltrated by the
well-organized  Brazilian  garimpeiros (prospectors)?  The  article  also  suggests  another
interesting perspective.  The development of gold mining as an industry in Guyana is
enlisted  in  the  service  of  political  demands  for  autonomy:  the  regional  council
encourages mining as part of a policy of empowerment and recovery of resources long
monopolized by the colonizer, in a way reminiscent of current dynamics in the Northern
Province of New Caledonia, where there is a nickel boom. Development through mining
can be interpreted either as a vector of political emancipation, or as an expression of
commitment  to  a  European  concept  of  development  (modern  industries  and  the
capitalistic and individualistic values that go along with them) opposed to alternative
values that might have strengthened indigenous political dissent.
16 Romain Dittgen in turn addresses the capacity for change associated with the Chinese
project for an iron mine at Bélinga in Gabon; a contract was signed in 2006, but work has
not yet been started on it. The project is put into perspective through reference to the
history of mining cycles in Gabon (Pourtier, 1989), to the situation in Africa during the
2000s,  marked  by  massive  Chinese  investment  in  extractive  resources  (Alden,  Large,
Soares de Oliveira, 2008), and to relations between Gabon and China. The Bélinga project
sees  the  meeting  of  Gabon’s  need  for  economic  and  diplomatic  diversification  with
China’s appetite for raw materials to feed its global factory. The asymmetry between the
parties  involved when the project  was  initially  being discussed is  not  unlike  that  of
Western multinationals in negotiations with African nations seeking to increase their
royalty revenues. From the outset, the project was deeply political, in the sense that it
was made possible by discussions at the highest level between the governments of China
and Gabon. A Chinese company was chosen over a Brazilian competitor, under less than
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transparent  conditions.  The  project  forms  part  of  China’s  overall  strategy  in  Africa,
claimed to be “win-win,” in the form of assistance in kind (infrastructure) in exchange for
control  over  raw  materials.  The  exploitation  of  Bélinga’s  iron  requires  an  initial
investment of $2.2 billion and four years of construction work. The construction projects
include a railroad that will  open up access to mineral  deposits  in a quasi-wilderness
region, dams to provide energy, and an ore port capable of handling 20 million tonnes per
year, among other things. Dittgen analyzes the potential after-effects both nationwide
and in the region of production, as well as the uncertainty surrounding the project’s
implementation:  the 2008 crisis  and the fall  in the price of  iron play a role,  as does
political uncertainty in Gabon following the death of Omar Bongo, who had personally
intervened in the rapprochement with the Chinese. His death was an opportunity for
NGOs and the national media to criticize the terms of the contract, seen as unfavorable to
the state as a whole, to local communities, and to the environment. Delaying the project
led especially to questions about the “special case” of the Chinese, for whom short-term
profitability is apparently secondary to long-term strategic aims – which would explain
why  political  relations  trumped  financial  calculations  during  negotiations  over  the
project. The Bélinga project is also reminiscent of the iron mine at Falémé in Senegal,
where the Indian steel  giant  Mittal  obtained an exploitation license in exchange for
promises  of  substantial  investment  in  infrastructure  and  local  employment,  before
pulling out as a result of the 2008 crisis. In Bolivia, the choice of the Indian company
Jindal Steel to exploit the Mutun iron mine (40 billion tonnes) has led today to a parallel
public debate about the company’s ability to conduct exploitation on that scale and about
the favors it has apparently received from the government. Whatever the truth of the
matter, the lesser profitability of mining compared to petroleum extraction explains the
hard-to-interpret global strategies of these giant companies, now often Chinese, Indian,
or Brazilian.  These companies balance very long-term thinking against  the effects  of
short  business  cycles,  sometimes only seeking to have control  over reserve deposits,
sometimes going a step further to their actual exploitation. These strategies make it all
the more clear that the host countries are in a position of weakness in negotiating the
conditions of exploitation.
17 Nicolas Donner’s contribution borrows a medical metaphor to describe the ways in which
oil  extraction  sites  fit  into  their  host  environment.  Starting  with  the  paradox  that
movement worldwide depends on a powerful yet inert material, “Notes sur la dimension
immunitaire  des  enclaves  pétrolières”  (“Notes  on  the  immune  system  of  petroleum
enclaves”) describes the techniques used to immunize the petroleum extraction system
from the potential  dangers  of  its  host  environment,  as  a  necessary condition of  the
distribution of the resource. To do this he brings in various examples of such enclaves
around the world, focusing on those in the most hostile regions, meaning wilderness and
lawless areas, especially in Africa. Two chief types of immunization are discussed. Some
oil-producing  enclaves  are  designed  to  be  as  autonomous  as  possible  from  their
surroundings.  The  core  of  those  located  in  wilderness  areas  is  an  archetype  of  this
approach,  halfway  between  a  hyper-modern  city  (which  delivers  an  almost  entirely
artificial environment) and a space capsule (which delivers a very compact living space).
Oil enclaves thus more or less perfectly approximate the model of the “absolute island,”
as Sloterdijk (2005) calls it. They also illustrate a paradoxical form of being in the world,
characterized both by isolation vis-à-vis the immediate vicinity and connection to the
rest of the world, especially to the other key points of the archipelago. There is a wide
spectrum of  immunization methods,  right down to “petronaut” clothing,  such as the
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long-sleeved garments worn by Exxon project staff in Chad to protect them from malaria.
In inhabited areas, especially in the case of geopolitically sensitive regions of “fragile”
states (in the terminology of the Bretton Woods institutions), immunization has a dual
function, defensive and interventionist. The defensive function is ensured by a series of
protective “coatings” (guards, walls, limited access areas) surrounding the facilities. The
solidity of  these barriers varies depending on the situation,  but  they are never fully
sealed,  thus  allowing  the  extractive  facilities  to  breathe  and  maintain  a  degree  of
flexibility in their external relations. The interventionist function concerns the control of
working relationships with the host environment: this is where the lexical, ideological,
and  methodological  arsenal  of  CSR  and  sustainable  development  language  can  be
deployed successfully. 
18 More  broadly,  Donner’s  article  examines  the  uses  of  the  ideology  of  sustainable
development with respect to resource extraction systems. This dominant paradigm is not
only  a  more  or  less  successful  response  to  the  anger  aroused by  the  most  negative
impacts of resource extraction in the 1990s; more fundamentally, it seems to function as
one  of  the  immunization  strategies  (used  by  both  companies  and  large  donors)
introduced into extraction industries in response to the requirements of the dominant
countries.  Thus the paradigm of sustainable development,  coupled with strategies for
stabilization and local legitimation, fits as neatly with strategies for the security of energy
supplies as it does with the sensitivities of public opinion in the West. Ethical values are
manipulated to serve the “social license to operate” and to secure the zones of production
– although in  practice  this  does  not  mean that  this  strategy is  always  implemented
smoothly. The Chad-Cameroon project financed by the World Bank is a good example of
this approach and of its limitations. The article adopts the perspective of the petroleum
industry and focuses on the point at which it is “grafted” onto the sites where extraction
occurs.  Reversing the perspective,  looking at the intrusion of the petroleum industry
from the point of view of the host environment, and the ways in which it supports, on
various  levels,  imaginary  constructions  and  industry  strategies,  could  extend  the
argument of the article in an interesting direction. Lastly, it could be asked whether this
interpretation of the oil enclaves’ immunization techniques might be applicable to other
forms of extraction: though on a much smaller scale, gold and diamond mining may be
similar.  However,  very  large  mining  projects,  the  kind  that  involve  massive  local
infrastructure  and  create  many  jobs,  would  surely  represent  a  rather  different
geographical model.
19 Lastly,  Rémy  Canavesio’s  article,  “Croissance  économique  des  pays  émergents  et
géographie mondiale des pierres précieuses” (“Economic growth in emerging countries
and the geography of precious stones”) discusses less well studied resources that have
distinct characteristics of their own. By the standards of the global oil and gas industries,
they are economically trivial: the figures involved are in no way comparable, and they
can be dismissed as having frivolous or merely symbolic value. But the geography of
precious stones is complex, and shapes global industries with important results for local
geographies.  Extraction sites,  channels,  and markets  vary depending on the precious
stones concerned. Canavesio addresses the dynamics of the precious stone industry as a
whole, but rather than focus on diamonds, the best known, he discusses the less well-
known sapphires and rubies. The first goal is to understand the factors that affect their
geographic distribution. Unlike oil,  these factors are not geopolitical or strategic, and
unlike gold, the precious stone industry is almost entirely unaffected by the liberalization
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of mining regulations, because it is mostly carried on in informal and artisanal ways. On
the  other  hand,  sites  of  consumption  are  partly  due  to  longstanding  historical  and
cultural  factors,  and  changes  in  consumption  patterns  have  a  lot  to  do  with
macroeconomic  dynamics.  Global  demand  for  precious  stones  is  similar to  that  for
automobiles:  it  is  driven  by  the  increasing  wealth  of  emerging  countries,  whereas
Western markets have been “mature” for a long time. Diamonds, whose production and
consumption are generally detached from their country of origin, benefit from each rapid
increase in wealth in a large population (see Brunet, 2004). However, the growing wealth
of the major emerging countries does not express itself  in the same ways.  While the
Chinese love jade, their thirst for (Western-style!) consumption is likely soon to make
them turn to diamonds, as the Japanese have done. In India, by contrast, longstanding
cultural resistance to Westernization is expressed in a continuing preference for rubies
and sapphires. Increasing wealth has also transformed the geography of supply. Since the
mining of precious stones is mostly artisanal, their high value makes this a profitable
activity for the poor, even when the stones are found in low concentrations. Artisanal
mining thus contributes to regionally based operations that contrast sharply with the
industrial-level  enclaves  of  other  extraction sectors.  From the  diamond belt  of  West
Africa to that of Central Africa (Central African Republic and Kassai-Northeast Angola),
from the emeralds and amethysts of Colombia and Minas Gerais in Brazil to the sapphires
and rubies  of  southern Sri  Lanka,  from the Thai-Cambodian border  to  the region of
Mogok in Burma, the geography of artisanal mining overlaps that of poor areas, often
enclaves or isolated regions, some of them in conflict or newly post-conflict. The factors
that influence the dynamics of regions with deposits of precious stones do not simply
relate to matching demand with a supply that depends on geological luck. The known
concentrations have to be too low to warrant mechanization, and the level of poverty or
of crisis has to be kept elevated enough to make it worthwhile for the locals to continue
operations that are arduous, dangerous, and not reliably profitable. Strong Asian demand
for  sapphires  and  rubies  will  not  be  adequate  to  prevent  the  decline  in  output  in
Thailand, the victim of that country’s relative increase in wealth. East Africa (Tanzania,
Kenya, Madagascar, Somalia), which has many small scattered deposits in countries with
poor political and economic conditions, might be the next region to be asked to meet
future demand, and if so those will see the greatest number of new “gem rushes.”
20 Despite its  wealth of  subject-matter,  this  dossier omits many important topics.  Some
geographical regions are missing, including the Middle East, Russia, the Nordic countries,
and the major emerging countries apart from China. Geographic differences in the new
energy nationalisms are barely touched on, nor are analyses of environmental hazards or
the landscapes of resource extraction. Petro-politics and the “resource wars” are other
broad topics only mentioned in passing. This issue of Echogéo simply lays some of the
groundwork for a subject that will become more important in years to come as expected
changes in the energy field begin to come about. For while no one is yet in a position to
predict the exact timing and character of these changes, we can nonetheless conjecture
that this reshuffling of the cards in the energy field and hence in the corridors of power
will have massive implications.
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NOTES
1.  EchoGéo No. 8, March-May2009 http://echogeo.revues.org/10263 
2.  A research group was created in 2009 by historians from the CNAM and EHESS (France) to
study “industrial excesses” in the city and the conflicts they generate. The concept of “industrial
excesses” (“débordements”), which is still to be defined precisely, includes accidents, pollution,
hazards, and risks associated with industrial activities. Extractive industries play a major role
here. http://www.debordementindustriel.fr/modeles/presentation.htm 
3.  See the editorial by Alain Juppé, “l’Afrique doit être notre ‘nouvelle frontière’” (“Africa should
be  our  ‘new frontier’”)  in  the  dossier  “Afrique,  nouvelle  terre  de  conquête”  (“Africa,  a  new
territory to conquer”), Diplomatie No. 52, September 2011 (p. 10).
4.  This term refers to the idea that in “fragile” states oil revenues allow tiny elites, freed of all
social  or political  responsibility toward their fellow-citizens,  to remain in power indefinitely,
since  these  revenues  finance  the  means  of  repression  and  guarantee  unconditional  support
internationally for the regimes.
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5.  By contrast, in Latin America starting in the mid-2000s, the nationalization of hydrocarbons in
Bolivia and the renegotiation of contracts in Ecuador and Venezuela are more typical of a post-
neoliberal period. 
6.  In the petroleum industry, deep-sea exploration remains the preserve of the Western majors.
While  the  Brazilian  company Petrobras  has  recently  made notable  advances  in  this  domain,
Chinese and Indian companies still play an insignificant role. 
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